Courts, Contracts, and the
Appropriate Discount Rate:

A Quick Fix for the Legal Lottery
ChristopherP. Bowerst
Although courts have long recognized that "[u]ncertainty and
ambiguity are the bane of commerce,"' they often fail to practice
what they preach. In an era of increasingly complex transactions
and big-money deals, the legal system subjects sophisticated
commercial parties to ambiguous standards and uncertain damage awards.2 One businessman, tired of the vagaries of the
system, aptly described going to court as a "legal lottery where
you don't know whether you will win; and if you win, you may be
either under or overcompensated."3
When courts select discount rates for measuring lost future
profits in commercial-contract disputes, this uncertainty is especially troubling. Discounting is the process by which courts take
into account the time value of money to avoid overcompensating
the injured party.4 The process is relatively straightforward,
requiring the court to find an interest rate at which an injured

t BA. 1994, Fordtam College; J.D. Candidate 1997, The University of Chicago.
Merritt v Welsh, 104 US 694, 702 (1881).
2 See, for example, Edward Felsenthal, Increase in Size of Jury Awards May Spur
Efforts to Alter System, Wall St J B2, B2 (Jan 5, 1996) (explaining that the size of jury
awards increased for the second year in a row and that this data may help spur an
overhaul of the civil justice system); Oki America, Inc. v Microtech International,Inc., 872
F2d 312, 315 (9th Cir 1989) (Kozinski concurring) (commenting that the California tort of
bad faith denial of contract "generates serious costs and uncertainties, trivializes the law
and denies individuals and businesses the autonomy of adjusting mutual rights and
responsibilities through voluntary contract").
' David Baumer and Patricia Marschall, Willful Breach of Contractfor the Sale of
Goods: Can the Bane of Business Be an Economic Bonanza?, 65 Temple L Rev 159, 166
(1992) (analyzing the results of a survey presenting the business community's reaction to
deliberate breach).
" See, for example, Dan B. Dobbs, 2 Law of Remedies § 8.5(3) at 469 (West 2d ed
1993) ("[Present value's] aim is to find and award a sum of money which, when invested
safely, will suffice to pay all the future damages as they occur by using both the award
itself and the interest it earns."). See also Roger D. Blair, Measuring Damages for Lost
Profits in FranchiseTermination Cases, 8 Franchise L J 3, 4 (Fall 1988) ("Generally, the
plaintiff wants a lump-sum award that is economically equivalent to what has been
lost.... In other words, the plaintiff wants a lump-sum payment that can be invested
today to yield a stream of payments in the future that will replace the profit stream.").

1099

1100

The University of Chicago Law Review

[63:1099

party can invest the damage fund. But the court must choose the
proper rate to get the right result.5 Indeed, a difference of 1
percent or less in the discount rate used in the present value
calculations can result in millions of dollars lost or gained in a
damage award. 6
The case law concerning the selection of appropriate discount
rates for measuring lost future profits in contract disputes is in
disarray. Discount-rate selection requires a finding of fact; thus,
the choice of the appropriate discount rate is left to the wisdom
of the fact finder. In practice, juries have produced inconsistent
results, and judges have found in favor of rates based on vague
"fair and reasonable" rationales.' Discretion thus prevails in
contract discount-rate determinations-decisions that are even
more complicated than the discounting of lost future wages in
tort adjudications, where courts simply choose an interest rate
that would be earned on "the best and safest investments."8

' See Manfred H. Ledford and Dennis P. Zocco, New Evidence on the Selection of an
AppropriateDiscount Rate in Economic Loss Determinations,36 Fed'n Ins & Corp Couns
Q 27, 39 (1985) ("[Tihe choice of a discount rate to be used in the determination of the
present value equivalent of a stream of economic losses is extremely critical."); Blair, 8
Franchise L J at 6, 23 (cited in note 4) ("In order to calculate correctly the present value
of the lost profits, one must select the correct discount rate from a considerable number of
alternatives.").
6 For a discussion of how differences in discount rates affect damage awards, see
text accompanying notes 25-28.
See Section I.B.
Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v Kelly, 241 US 485, 491 (1916). Tort commentators have wrestled with trying to implement this standard for decades. For a representative sampling of such articles, see note 57.
The tort commentary offers only tangential assistance to a court adjudicating a
commercial-contract dispute for three reasons. First, the tort commentary focuses on an
individual's lost earnings and not on a corporation's lost profits. A corporation is assumed
to have greater financial expertise and should not be held to the same (lower) standard of
investment acumen as the individual. See text accompanying notes 126-34.
Second, the methodologies for calculating rates of return vary in the tort and commercial-contract contexts. Experts employ an array of financial theories to calculate potential rates of return for corporations, but most of the tort commentary focuses on only one
theory: the risk-free rate of return for individuals. See generally Gary A. Anderson and
David L. Roberts, Economic Theory and the Present Value of FutureLost Earnings:An Integration, Unification, and Simplification of Court Adopted Methodologies, 39 U Miami L
Rev 723 (1985); Frank Slesnick, Can a Court Effectively Determine Discount Rates: An
Economic Perspective, 14 U Dayton L Rev 81 (1988).
Finally, commercial-contract law is a body of clear default rules around which
parties can bargain. Tort law, however, generally deals with involuntary exchanges and
typically does-not contemplate parties bargaining around default rules before the fact.
Thus the tort commentary is at best an imperfect guide for courts seeking the most
appropriate default rule in a commercial-contract dispute.
The tort commentary does, however, provide useful and pertinent discussions about
the perils of discounting in general and is thus applicable in this limited respect. Indeed,
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Commercial parties are left to struggle with the uncertainty of
random results and rulings without rationales.
Experts, rather than helping fact finders do their job, have
merely compounded the confusion and aggravated the variability
of the results. As the world of finance has become more sophisticated, parties have eagerly introduced financial experts to testify
as to appropriate discount rates and to impress fact finders.
Financial analysis, however, offers a smorgasbord of approaches
to computing a business's expected return on investments, and
each approach yields different results. Moreover, expensive
experts can manipulate assumptions and data to generate disparate results even within the same theory. Finally, expert commentators write mainly for other experts and have failed to
bridge the gap between the world of law and the world of finance.9 This battle of the experts does little more than add
confusion and cost to an already chaotic regime.
A discretionary regime, marked by uncertainty and expense,
presently determines the appropriate discount rate. Such a
regime encourages parties to use experts because fact finders
defer to them. If one party presents an expert, the other party
may be at a disadvantage if it fails to present its own.'0
Businesses thus truly engage in a perverse lottery in which
parties pay a great deal for small or nonexistent benefits.
This Comment argues that courts should dismantle the
discretionary discount rate and thereby eliminate many of the
costs and uncertainties of the legal lottery. It proposes that
courts adopt an easily identifiable, fixed market peg, such as the
Dow Jones Industrial Average, a corporate-bond index, or the
Treasury bill rate, when discounting lost future profits in breachof-contract cases." By fixing the discount rate to such a market

some of these articles provide good reference points for implementing contract-law innovations. See note 136.
' In fact, one economist has claimed that financial experts have failed to fill gaps
even within the world of finance. See W. Cris Lewis, The Role of the Discount and Reinvestment Rate in CalculatingFuture Economic Loss, 34 Fed'n Ins Couns Q 223, 223 (1984)
("In my opinion, some 'experts' regularly use discount rates without fully understanding
the implications of the discounting process. The use of significantly different rates by
experts in the same or similar cases goes beyond mere disagreement about the level of
interest rates in the future.").
10 See Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner, and Randal C. Picker, Game Theory and
the Law 64 (Harvard 1994) ("Litigation is like a contest because the chances of success
turn in some measure on which party spends the most. Once one party spends money on
litigation, the other party has an incentive to respond by spending a little bit more.").

" Pegging the discount rate to a financial index does not fix the rate for all time.
Market indices, such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average, are merely composites of
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peg on the day of the breach, neither judge, jury, nor expert
determines the discount rate. Rather, the natural ebb and flow of
financial markets will do the job. The resulting benefits of increased certainty and lower decision costs should justify abandoning the misguided search for the "right" rate.
Section I illustrates the mechanics of discounting in lostprofit disputes. It also highlights the importance of choosing the
proper discount rate and examines how fact finders have failed to
perform this vital task. Section II analyzes five approaches that
expert practitioners may employ to calculate appropriate discount
rates and explains how each of these approaches fails as a proper
default rule for choosing discount rates in commercial-contract
disputes. Finally, Section III proposes that courts break from the
discretionary discount regime and select a rate based on a fixed
market peg, preferably the medium-grade-corporate-bond rate. To
support this argument, Section III employs a common sense, costbenefit analysis comparing the proposed fixed-rate rule to the
discretionary regime now in place. The Comment concludes that
the use of a fixed rate would eliminate many of the private and
social costs of the current discretionary approach without causing
unreasonable disruptions, thus increasing certainty and clarity to
the benefit of commerce.
I. COURTS AND DIScouNT RATES

Courts recognize that they must discount awards of lost
future profits in contract disputes to avoid overcompensating the
injured plaintiff. No standards, however, guide courts through
the essential mechanics of discounting, especially the choice of
the appropriate discount rate. Accordingly, such decisions are
products of judicial discretion, and parties are often subject to
unpredictable results based on uncertain rationales.
A. Compensation and Contract Law: The Discount Solution
1. The time value of money and the compensation principle.
Injured commercial parties often receive lump-sum damage
awards to compensate them for lost future profits.' Courts in-

selected financial instruments for which rates of return or prices vary over time. Accordingly, "fixing" the discount rate does not mean fixing it to a particular interest rate.
Rather, this Comment proposes to fix, or peg, the discount rate to an index that changes
over time, tracking investment opportunities available in current financial markets.
1 Lost profits are generally accepted as a form of consequential damages for breach
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tend for this lump-sum award to replace money that the injured
party would have earned over the remaining term of the broken
contract. For example, a company that was supposed to earn
$100,000 a year in profits on a ten-year contract that fell apart
on day one would argue for a cash award of $1 million to compensate it for the profits that it would have made but for the
breach.
If the injured company received this award undiscounted,
however, it could immediately invest the cash and earn even
more money than it would have earned under the contract. Money has time value: $1 million, invested at an annual interest rate
of 10 percent, earns $100,000 of interest per year. 3 The injured
plaintiff could invest the undiscounted damage award, recoup its
lost profits over the ten-year period, and still have $1 million
remaining in the bank after the original term of the contract
expires.
A court adjudicating this case would be caught in a dilemma.
Awarding the injured company the full million dollars now would
certainly overcompensate the company because it could convert
the cash into a greater stream of income than it expected under
the contract.'4 This would violate the principal goal of contract

of contract. See UCC § 2-708(2) (West 1989) ("[Tihe measure of damages is the
profit... which the seller would have made from full performance .... ").
3 The expected growth of a principal amount due to interest compounding can be determined by calculating the principal amount's future value. The computation of future
value is relatively straightforward. A given principal amount P compounded annually at a
given interest rate (i) for a given number of years (t) will have a future value (FV) at the
end of that time given by the exponential function:
FV = P(1 + i
Thus, plugging in the values cited in the above example, we find that the future value of
the damage award at the end of year one is:
FV = 1,000,000(1 + .10)
= 1,000,000(i.1)
= 1,100,000
The plaintiff can then skim off the interest and keep the $1 million safely invested, ready
to earn another year of interest. For a basic introduction to the mechanics of finding future values, see Edward T. Dowling, Introduction to Mathematical Economics 176
(McGraw-Hill 2d ed 1992).
14 See Gillanders v Gillanders, 49 Wash App 457, 743 P2d 1252, 1253-54 (1987),
quoting Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies 178 (West 1973) ("fAin award for payments due
in the future... would overcompensate the plaintiff [for his damages], because it would
give him the money not due him until later, which would allow him to have the money
when due, plus all the interest he might earn on it.").
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damages: to give the plaintiff the benefit of his contract and no
more. 5 Both parties, however, want the "clean break" of a lumpsum award in order to avoid the costly future dealings that a
stream of damage payments would entail. How then can a court
satisfy both parties without overcompensating the injured one?
2. The discount solution.
Finance theory offers a solution to this compensation dilemma. If the plaintiff can invest an award that will grow to a certain sum in the future, why not start with the future value and
work backwards to figure out the proper award today? In other
words, the court should give the plaintiff an amount now such
that, when invested, "the sum of the original award plus interest
will just equal the anticipated loss. "16 Accordingly, the court

should award the present value of the future profits-the amount
delivered today that will grow under current investment conditions to compensate the plaintiff in the future.'
Discounting is the process of determining the present value
of a future sum of money. 8 When finding present value, the dis"

See Samuel Williston, 11 A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 1338 at 198 (Baker,

Voorhis 3d ed 1968) ("In fixing the amount of these damages, the general purpose of the
law is, and should be, to give compensation, that is, to put the plaintiff in as good a
position as he would have been in had the defendant kept his contract."). See also
Hawkins v McGee, 84 NH 114, 146 A 641, 643 (1929) (quoting Williston).
" Roy F. Gilbert, Forensic Discount Rates, 4 J Legal Econ 40, 40 (Dec 1991). For
additional discussion regarding the purposes of discounting and the need to achieve
proper levels of compensation, see William F. Landsea and David L. Roberts, Inflation
and the Present Value of Future Economic Damages, 37 U Miami L Rev 93, 95 (1982);
Dobbs, 2 Law of Remedies § 8.5(3) at 469 (cited in note 4).
17 See Robert L. Dunn, Recovery of Damagesfor Lost Profits § 6.12 at 278 (Lawpress
2d ed 1981) (stating that if an "award is to compensate for a loss of profits projected over
ten years, the amount should be that which, if invested for ten years at appropriate
(probably conservative) rates of return, will produce the amount of the loss").
1 Present value is simply the inverse of future value. Using the formula in note 13,
in which P is the principal invested and FV is the future value expected, we derive the
present value formula by solving for P:
FV = P( + i)
P = FVI(1 + V
P = FV(1 + iY
This formula tells us the present value of a particular
our $1 million hypothetical, this formula can be used
for each year of the contract to its present value. Thus,
10 percent, the present value of the $100,000 to be
$90,909:
P = 100,000(1 + .10)

sum received in the future. Under
to discount the $100,000 payment
again assuming an interest rate of
paid after year one equals about
"
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count rate is merely the interest rate or rate of return that the
plaintiff expects his money to earn.'9 Accordingly, assuming 10
percent as the proper discount rate, the present value of
$100,000 in profits per year for ten years is approximately
$614,460.20 The plaintiff can then invest this amount to offset
the $100,000 annual loss for the next ten years. By awarding the
present value of the lost profits, a court will compensate the
injured party neither too little nor too much.
B. The Courts' Response: Confusion
1. Discounting and the appropriate discount rate.
Courts generally accept the principle that "a dollar to-day is
worth more than a dollar next year, and to ignore the interval as
immaterial is to contradict well-settled beliefs about value."2 '
Indeed, in Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v Kelly, the Supreme
Court commanded that "in all cases where it is reasonable to
suppose that interest may safely be earned upon the amount that
is awarded, the ascertained future benefits ought to be discounted in the making up of the award."22 Accordingly, from cases in

= 100,000(.909091)
= 90,909.10
The present value of $100,000 to be paid after year two equals about $82,645. The present
values of $100,000 to be paid after years three through ten can be calculated in a similar
way. After the discounting process is complete, the discounted values are added together
to find the total present value of this future stream of income.
Alternatively, one can use the following formula to discount future streams of
income where, as in the above example, the FV is the same for each year and interest is
compounded annually:
P = S(I/i)[1 - (1 + i) " ]
Here, S represents the annual stream of future income. This formula saves much time
and effort, especially if the expected stream of profits is paid over many years. See

Dowling, MathematicalEconomics at 177-78 (cited in note 13).
'0

Id at 177.
Plugging our numbers into the above formula we find:

P

= (100,000/.10)[1 - (1.10)_1]
= (1,000,OOOX.6144567)

=_614,460
Often these tedious calculations can be avoided through the use of present and future
value tables found in most introductory financial accounting books. See, for example,
Michael A. Diamond, FinancialAccounting 901 (South-Western 3d ed 1993).
" Proctor& Gamble DistributingCo. v Sherman, 2 F2d 165, 166 (S D NY 1924).
22 241 US 485, 490 (1916). See also Monessen Southwestern Railway Co. v Morgan,
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bankruptcy and property to cases in tort and contract," most
courts discount future streams of income to account for the time
value of money and to award more finely tuned compensation.24
Proper discounting, however, requires the choice of a proper
discount rate. In commercial contracts, where the stakes are
high, a difference of 1 percent in the discount rate can have substantial effects on the damage award.2" For example, a decrease
in the discount rate from 10 percent to 9 percent in our above
example increases the plaintiff's damage award by over
$27,000.26 Conversely, an increase in the discount rate from 10

486 US 330, 339-40 (1988) (finding that damage awards in federal law should be discounted to present value).
See, for example, In re Monnier Brothers, 755 F2d 1336, 1337 (8th Cir 1985) (bankruptcy); Whitney Benefits, Inc. v United States, 18 Cl Ct 394, 399 (1989) (property); O'Shea
v Riverway Towing Co., 677 F2d 1194, 1197 (7th Cir 1982) (tort); American List Corp v
U.S. News and World Report, Inc., 75 NY2d 38, 550 NYS 2d 590, 592 (1989) (contract).
24 Some jurisdictions, however, have expressly rejected the use of discounting, opting
instead for a "total offset" rule. The total offset method recognizes that money has time
value, but argues that inflation offsets any potential accrual of interest. Essentially, the
theory assumes that no real rate of interest exists. See, for example, Beaulieu v Elliott,
434 P2d 665, 671 (Alaska 1967) ("[Jlustice will best be served by permitting the trier of
fact to compute loss of future earnings without reduction to present value."); Kaczkowski v
Bolubasz, 491 Pa 561, 421 A2d 1027, 1039 (1980) ("[T]he courts of this Commonwealth are
instructed to abandon the practice of discounting lost future earnings.").
The few jurisdictions that have adopted this doctrine initially confined the rule to
tort injuries. One court, however, used it to award undiscounted damages in a contract
dispute. See Bloomfield Financial Corp v National Home Life Assurance Co., 734 F2d
1408, 1413 (10th Cir 1984) (affirming the district court's ruling that the total offset rule
would be applied in Pennsylvania to lost future commissions in a contract dispute). No
other court, however, has extended this rule to contract cases, and the rule remains the
minority position for tort cases.
The following table illustrates the present value of annual profit streams over a
ten-year period at varying discount rates:
Discount Rates
Annual Amounts

8%

9%

10%

11%

12%

$100,000

$671,010

$641,770

$614,460

$588,920

$565,020

$500,000

$3,355,050

$3,208,850

$3,072,300

$2,944,600

$2,825,100

$1,000,000

$6,710,100

$6,417,700

$6,144,600

$5,889,200

$5,650,020

26 Using the table of discounted values in note 25, one finds that the present value of
a ten-year stream of $100,000 payments at a 9-percent discount rate is $641,770, and at a
10-percent discount rate is $614,460. The difference between these two amounts ($641,770
- $614,460) equals $27,310. (Note that the relationship between the discount rate and the
amount of the damage award needed to fully compensate the plaintiff is an inverse one;
the higher the discount rate, the lower the damage award, and vice-versa.)

19961

Quick Fix for the Legal Lottery

1107

percent to 11 percent decreases the present value of the damage
award by over $25,000.27 Indeed, the spread between an 8-percent discount rate and a 12-percent rate results in a damage
award differential of over $100,000. Moreover, as the table in
note 25 vividly illustrates, the higher the potential profits, the
greater the present-value differential associated with the discount rate.2" Thus, as the stakes increase, so does the importance of the discount rate.

2. Discretion without guidance.
Courts have treated the choice of discount rate as case
specific, allowing complex calculations and vital assumptions to
vary based on the nature of a given dispute. The selection of a
discount rate is generally considered a finding of fact, not a matter of law, and thus the ultimate choice of the appropriate discount rate is the sole province of the fact finder, be it judge or
jury. 9 In jury trials, the judge usually instructs the jury in
broad terms and lets them choose the discount rate based on
expert testimony and other evidence." The Fifth Circuit's description of Texas's jury instruction for discounting damages in
breach-of-contract cases reveals the broad discretion that fact
finders enjoy:

'

Again, using the table in note 25, one finds that the present value of a ten-year

stream of $100,000 payments at a 10-percent discount rate is $614,460, and at an 11-percent discount rate is $588,920. The difference between these two amounts ($614,460 $588,920) equals $25,540.
'
On a contract worth $1 million per year, a 1-percent increase or decrease in the
initial 10-percent discount rate modifies the lost-profit award by over $250,000. On a $10
million-per-year contract, the differential would be over $2,500,000.
See generally Dobbs, 2 Law of Remedies § 8.5(3) at 472 (cited in note 4).
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the trial court has broad discretion in admitting expert testimony. See Hamling v United States, 418 US 87, 108 (1974) ('[T]he District Court has wide discretion in its determination to admit and exclude evidence, and
this is particularly true in the case of expert testimony."); United States v Beasley, 72 F3d
1518, 1528 (11th Cir 1996) (citing Hamling).
If the parties fail to offer evidence on the discount rate, they risk pure judicial
formulation. See TaylorPublishingCo. v Systems MarketingInc., 686 SW2d 213, 217 (Tex
Ct App 1984), where, in a case involving a breach of a computer lease, the trial judge took
judicial notice of the discount rate in determining damages under the lease. The parties
offered no evidence of the proper discount rate, but the Court of Appeals found that in
Texas, "specific evidence of the present value discount rate is not required and the trial
court may determine the present value of future damages." Id. See also Binghamton
Masonic Temple Inc. v City of Binghamton, 158 Misc 2d 916, 602 NYS2d 310, 313 (NY
Sup Ct 1993) (refusing to hear expert testimony not offered at trial in case involving a
breach of a loan agreement and taking judicial notice of the discount rate).
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The Texas cases are not ambiguous. Discounting of future
damage awards is adequately handled by the trial judge if
he simply instructs the jury that damages are equal to the
"sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash" that would compensate the plaintiff.... Texas courts refuse to amplify this
simple instruction because they believe that further explanation would confuse the jury.3
This instruction tells fact finders only "to compensate," leaving
them to decide how with few constraints and little guidance. 2
Given this combination of broad discretion and little guidance, it is not surprising that juries regularly fail to understand
the need to discount to present value, let alone the mechanics of
finding the proper discount rate. Indeed, in the same case in
which the Fifth Circuit affirmed Texas's simple jury instruction,
it found that "although the instruction was correct, the jury evidently did not follow it." 3 Accordingly, the court remanded the
case so that the trial judge could "determine an appropriate discount rate and compute the present value of the award for contract earnings." 4 Other jurisdictions have experienced similar
problems with jury discounting of damage awards. 3 A few jurisdictions have tried to eliminate jury discretion in discounting,
expressly leaving the choice of discount rates in tort cases up to
the discretion of judges 6 or even defining that rate by stat-

s

Budge v Post, 643 F2d 372, 375-76 (5th Cir 1981).
Other courts provide more guidance. For example, in Wingad v John Deere & Co.,
187 Wis 2d 441, 523 NW2d 274, 277 (Wis App 1994), the court reviewed the traditional
Wisconsin jury instruction for evaluating future damages. The instruction provides a good
common-sense description of present value, noting that "a sum received today can be
invested and earn money at current interest rates." Id. The court found that "[i]n calculating present value, future payoffs by the rate of return offered by comparable investment
alternatives are discounted. This rate of return is referred to as the discount
rate.... Evidence of a discount rate or range of discount rates, whether by stipulation or
testimony, is needed in calculating present value." Id. Still, in Wisconsin the ultimate
decision on the discount rate rests in the sole discretion of the jury. Id.
Budge, 643 F2d at 376.
' Id. The Fifth Circuit, however, did not define what the "appropriate" discount rate
was.
5 See, for example, SierraBlanca Sales Co. v Newco Industries,Inc., 88 NM 472,
542
P2d 52, 54 (NM App 1975) (reviewing a lower court's remittitur of a contract damage
award after the jury had failed to follow the lower court's discount instruction).
' Section 5041(e) of New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules requires plaintiffs
whose future damages in tort suits exceed $250,000 to purchase "an annuity contract that
will provide for the payment of the remaining amounts of future damages in periodic
installments." NY Civ Prac L & R § 5041(e) (McKinney 1992). Judges must determine the
present value of such a contract by "applying the discount rate in effect at the time of the
award to the full amount of the remaining future damages." Id. The statute does not
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ute. 7 No jurisdiction, however, has applied these innovations to
contract disputes.
Judges must struggle with the same discretion and lack of
guidance. Courts recognize that "[t]he discount rate is determined by financial markets at the time of termination,"" and
that "[there is no question that in order to compute the present
value of the damages a commercial interest rate [must] be determined."39 But such broad proclamations are generally not instructive. When confronted with the task of selecting an appropriate discount rate in a contract dispute, courts can select from
a panoply of possible interest rates, including the United States
Treasury bill, note, or bond rate, as well as the AAA or high-yield
corporate bond rate. Indeed, one court described the application
of a New York statute that requires individual courts to select
the "appropriate" discount rate as "every judge's nightmare.""
The fact finder-whether judge or jury-must therefore struggle
without proper legal direction in performing the difficult but vital
task of choosing the appropriate discount rate.
Even the Supreme Court has declined to adopt a standard to
guide federal courts through the mechanics of discounting. In
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp v Pfeifer, the Court refused to establish an exclusive method for calculating the present value of
lost-earnings awards in federal trials.4' Specifically, the Court
noted:
specify a discount rate; accordingly, "it is left to individual courts to determine an appropriate rate." In re New York Asbestos Litigation, 847 F Supp 1086, 1112 (S D NY
1994). See, for example, Reliant Airlines, Inc. v County of Broome, 1995 US Dist LEXIS
14223, *4-5 (N D NY 1995) (unpublished opinion) (Court had to choose between three
possible rates: plaintiff's expert's rate of 4.75 percent; plaintiff's alternative rate of 5.25
percent; and defendant's expert's rate of 6.11 percent.).
' See, for example, Mich Comp Laws Ann § 600.6306(2) (West 1987) (stating that the
discount rate for present value calculations of future damages shall be "5% per year for
each year in which those damages accrue"); Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 12-589(A) (West 1992)
(pegging the discount rate for tort awards to the most recent issue of the fifty-two-week
United States Treasury bill sold before the date the damages are discounted).
Bergkamp v Carrico, 108 Idaho 476, 700 P2d 98, 103 n 2 (Idaho App 1985).
CR1 Equipment Financing,Inc. v C&K Transport Inc., 448 NW2d 693, 695 (Iowa
App 1989).
40 Rohring v City of NiagaraFalls, 153 Misc 2d 1001, 584 NYS2d 513, 513 (NY Sup
Ct 1992) (construing NY Civ Prac L & R § 5041(e); see note 36 for a discussion of this
statute). Because the New York statute applies to lost future earnings for individuals, see
note 36, courts may have less trouble determining the appropriate discount rate because
they can employ the general "best and safest investments" standard. See text accompanying note 8. But if the New York process is a "nightmare" in the individual context, it can
only be more difficult for judges to figure out a discount rate for commercial parties, to
which multiple and more exacting standards can be applied.
41 462 US 523, 546-47 (1983).
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[B]y its very nature the calculation of an award for lost
earnings must be a rough approximation. Because the lost
stream can never be predicted with complete confidence, any
lump sum represents only a "rough and ready" effort to put
the plaintiff in the position he would have been in had he
not been injured.'
Moreover, the Court counseled that "[w]e do not suggest that the
trial judge should embark on a search for 'delusive exactness.' It
is perfectly obvious that the most detailed inquiry can at best
produce an approximate result."' Ultimately, the Court concluded that "whatever rate the District Court may choose to discount
the estimated stream of future earnings, it must make a deliberate choice."" Accordingly, as long as a court is "deliberate," its
selection of discount rates will likely satisfy the Court's standard.
3. Random results and uncertain rationales.
Because the law generally invests fact finders with such
broad discretion and so little guidance, discount-rate selection-especially in contract disputes-lacks rhyme and reason.
Commentators have noted that "[a] review of judgments awarded
by the courts reveals a hodge-podge of approaches and theories
on which awards have been rendered."45 One court described
"the case law with regard to an appropriate discount rate... [as]
a 'many-colored splendor' of conflicting and sometimes indecipherable formulas."46 Discretion has left the law in disarray.
Decisions regarding lost future profits reveal a wide variety
of selected rates, often without any strong economic rationale.
For example, courts have found a rate of 25 percent to be "substantial and conservative,"4 7 a rate of 7 percent to be "fair and
reasonable,"' and a rate of 6 percent to be "appropriate,"49 all
with little or no explanation. Moreover, the Second Circuit upheld without comment a jury's decision to discount the lost future
Id at 546.
Id at 552.
" Id at 552-53.
R.F. Lanzillotti and AX. Esquibel, MeasuringDamages in Commercial Litigation:
Present Value ofLost Opportunities,5 J Acct Aud & Fin 125, 125 (1990).
' In re Computer Optics, Inc., 126 Bankr 664, 671 (Bankr D NH 1991).
41 See Mirafi,Inc. v Murphy, 1989 US Dist LEXIS 16399, *36 (W D NC 1989) (unpublished opinion).
' See BridgkortRacquet Club, Inc. v University Bank, 85 Wis 2d 706, 271 NW2d 165,
170 (Wis App 1978).
'" See Groendyke Transport,Inc. v Merchant, 380 P2d 682, 686 (Okla 1962).
42
43
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profits of a broken liquor-distribution agreement at a 17-percent
rate even though the expert testifying at trial had discounted the
award by a 9-percent rate. 0 Indeed, the court focused on evidentiary points and ignored the $140,000 differential between the
expert and jury outcomes. 5 '
Fact finders, however, usually just accept one expert's opinion or even split the difference between competing experts or
possible methodologies.5 2 "[Clourts [recognize] that the term 'discount rate' has no fixed meaning and have accepted discount
rates testified to by a party's economist at trial." 3 Indeed, one
experienced expert remarked that "[tihe opinion of an expert on
damages is usually given great deference by the trial court." 4
Most decisions merely state their agreement with an expert's
conclusion without any explanation and then go on to other topics.5 By generally deferring to financial experts, judges and
juries ease their own decisional burdens and encourage parties to
use experts during the trial.
The reasoning of many courts has therefore been far from
"deliberate." Battered by financial formulae and confused by
conflicting expert testimony, fact finders operate a perverse legal
lottery that commercial parties are obliged to play. Uncertainty

' See Lee v Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 552 F2d 447, 455 (2d Cir 1977).
51 Id.
52 Courts will occasionally surprise experts and parties. In American List Corp v U.S.
News and World Report, Inc., 75 NY2d 38, 550 NYS2d 590 (1989), New York's highest
court rejected a lower court's finding of an 18-percent discount rate in a breach-of-contract
suit. The lower court had discounted lost future profits at 18 percent based on the testimony of the defendant's expert witness. Id at 594. The Court of Appeals, however, rejected this discount rate because it included a premium for the risk that the plaintiff would
not perform the contract. The Court held that this risk may not properly be considered in
damages for anticipatory breach and remanded the case for the determination of a proper
discount rate. Id.
' Binghamton Masonic Temple, Inc. v City of Binghamton, 158 Misc 2d 916, 602
NYS2d 310, 313 (NY Sup Ct 1993).
Blair, 8 Franchise L J at 3 (cited in note 4).
See, for example, LLECO Holdings, Inc. v Otto Candies,Inc., 867 F Supp 444, 451
(E D La 1994) (discounting lost future profits of an oil and gas lease at a rate of 25
percent after accepting an expert's testimony that the 25-percent figure was "more appropriate in figuring a fair return on investment for plaintiffs"); Westman Commission Co. v
Hobart Corp, 541 F Supp 307, 317 (D Colo 1982) (accepting expert's use of a 16.8-percent
rate to discount lost sales); Fen Hin Chon Enterprises,Ltd. v Porelon, Inc., 667 F Supp
1174, 1186-87 (M D Tern 1987) (accepting expert's use of 6.5-percent rate to discount
future profits from breach of a licensing agreement). See also Claims Mediator in Columbia Bankruptcy Case Recommends Methodology for RecalculatingProducer ContractRejection Claims on Uniform, ComparableBasis, Foster Nat Gas Rep (No 2001) 1, 2-3 (Oct
20, 1994) (reporting that a mediator chose a discount rate falling between rates offered by
various parties).
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and unnecessary expense thus prevail in a system without a
clear default rule.

II. EXPERT ANSWERS FOR COMMERCIAL PARTIES
One could argue that courts should continue to defer to experts or that they should simply pick the most popular financial
methodology and use it as the default rule, thus handing the
discount decision over to the experts. Experts, however, currently
offer courts a vast assortment of "appropriate" discount rates in
commercial-contract disputes, and each option ultimately fails as
a proper default rule. Indeed, each of the usual theories fails to
justify itself on simple cost-benefit principles.
The following analysis reviews and criticizes five approaches
that expert commentators have employed or examined when
finding the specific discount rate in lost-profiits disputes."
finance that experts commonly use in advocating specific discount
rates in lost-profits disputes. A basic understanding of these
methodologies is necessary to clarify and to critique the discounting debate. Three issues cut across each of the approaches reviewed in this section: unsettled theories, the potential for bias,
and high costs.
First, finance offers no one "best" way to find the appropriate
discount rate in commercial-contract disputes. Comentators have
only recently tackled the problem of damage valuation in commercial litigation.5 7 Accordingly, multiple approaches have
sprung up, taking the varied perspectives of the plaintiff, the

" This section surveys the practicioner literature on the discounting of profits in
commercial settings. The section attempts to explain some basic terminology, but is not
intended as a full discussion of finance theory, which begins discount rate selection in
project valuation with the capital asset pricing model ("CAPM") and builds up to the
weighted average cost of capital ("WACC"). Rather, this section focuses on general approaches and terms that courts may have dealt with before, organized from the most
familiar to the least familiar.
' See generally Allen Michel and Israel Shaked, Valuation of Damage Claims: An
Application of CorporateFinance, 19 J Bus Fin & Acc 455, 455 (1992) (finding that "the
issue of damage valuation has received virtually no consideration"); James E. Meyer,
Patrick Fitzgerald, and Mostafa Moini, Loss of Business Profits, Risk, and the Appropriate
Discount Rate, 4 J Legal Econ 27, 27 (1994) (noting that "little has been written on what
constitutes the proper discount rate to be applied to lost future business profits").
In contrast, commentators have written extensively on discounting lost future
earnings of individuals in the tort context. See generally Anderson and Roberts, 39 U
Miami L Rev 723 (cited in note 8); Slesnick, 14 U Dayton L Rev 81 (cited in note 8);
Thomas Havrilesky, New Evidence on Expected Long Term Interest Rates, 1 J Forensic
Econ 19 (1988). For a discussion of why this tort commentary is not directly applicable to
contract adjudication, see note 8.
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defendant, or even the market.58 Each method, however, brings
its own complications and its own unique results. Because financial experts themselves disagree over proper discounting techniques, courts cannot point to a dominant method that parties
could comfortably accept.
Second, experts can manipulate assumptions and numbers to
favor the party that employs them. 9 Experts agree that the application of theory to practice requires more pioneering work and
allows for great creativity. ° Financial models are easy to build,
but their implementation involves making assumptions and other
contentious decisions that lead to varied results. Accordingly, not
only can experts choose among competing theories, but they can
manipulate a given theory to produce more favorable results.
This potential for bias presents a salient problem whenever a
financial expert testifies.
Finally, experts and expert testimony are costly to the parties and to the court system, and the benefits of allowing experts
to fight it out at trial probably do not outweigh these costs. Given
the incentives to present expert evidence, the lack of consensus
among financial experts regarding discounting, and the inability
of fact finders to understand the underlying economic analysis,
the current regime encourages parties to overinvest in litigation
for an uncorrelated return. For all these reasons, deferring to the
experts is not a wise decision when constructing the proper discount default rule.

' Commentators do agree that experts disagree over the appropriate discount rate.

See, for example, Terence F. Cuff, Present Value and Internal Rate of Return, LA Lawyer
25, 25 (June 1991) ("How do you choose the correct discount rate? There is a lively debate
among economists and other experts about what is an appropriate discount rate in particular circumstances.").
' See, for example, ContractLodging Corp v Union Pacific Railroad, 1991 US Dist
LEXIS 18663, *4 (D Kan 1991) (unpublished opinion) (ignoring attempted expert manipulation of the discount rate after parties had stipulated to a rate of 7.5 percent).
' Michel and Shaked close their article with the following admonition and appeal:
Even though the academic world is adept at developing complex models, when it
comes to the courtroom, applying these models in an understandable and convincing
way is a challenge. We look forward to having more academics share their experiences as expert witnesses, thereby closing the gap between the world of finance and the

world of law.
19 J Bus Fin & Acc at 462 (cited in note 57).

1114

The University of ChicagoLaw Review

[63:1099

A. Weighted Average Cost of Capital
Some commentators have argued that courts should use a
formulaic average of the plaintiff's cost of capital or the costs of a
firm's various components of financing to determine the appropriate discount rate.6 Financial experts first calculate the individual components of a firm's capital structure, primarily the firm's
cost of debt (interest on borrowing) and cost of various stock
issues (rate that investors require the firm to earn on its equity).62 These components are then weighted according to some
standard (usually the relative proportions that the components
represent in the existing capital structure)63 and then averaged
according to the proposed weights.'

61 See id at 455 (presenting a case study applying the cost-of-capital method to the

valuation of damages from a broken contract). Other commentators advocate the use of
the cost-of-capital approach but argue that the ultimate discount rate should be adjusted
for the risk of the project. See Lanzillotti and Esquibel, 5 J Acct Aud & Fin at 132 (cited
in note 45) ("[Tihe plaintiff's damage award for profits... is the present value of the future profits discounted to the time of the award by the cost of capital adjusted to the risk
of the project."). Lanzillotti and Esquibel, who claim that "the uncertain future lost profits
are the easiest to deal with," id at 130, fail to explain how one should measure a firm's
cost of capital or how one should adjust the discount rate to the risk of the project.
' See James C. Van Home, FinancialManagementand Policy 235 (Prentice-Hall 9th
ed 1992).
' Id at 241-43. Van Home notes, however, that the relative weights should correspond to the proportions of financing that the firm intends to employ, thus allowing a firm
to maintain a constant capital structure over time for purposes of the relative-weight calculations. Id. Specifically, Van Home notes that in practice, [r]aising capital is 'lumpy,'
and strict proportions cannot be maintained." Id at 243. Therefore, "[o]ver time, most
firms are able to finance in roughly a proportional manner.... In other words, weighted
average cost of capital calculations should ignore temporary deviations from a target
capital structure, even though these deviations detract from the theoretical correctness of
the weighted average cost method." Id. This subtle difference between the intended
financing of a firm's capital structure and its actual financing illustrates just one of the
many elements in the cost-of-capital calculation that is subject to manipulation. See note
75 and accompanying text.
Accordingly, the weighted average cost of capital ("WACC") is expressed as follows:
WACC = (Proportion of Debt)(Debt Cost) + (Proportion of Equity)(Equity Cost)
Id at 217. Van Horn also provides an example to illustrate the mechanics of this formula:
Company X
Balance Sheet

(1) Amount

(2) Proportion

(3) Cost

Debt

$30 million

30%

7.20%

Preferred Stock

$10 million

10%

11.37%

Common Stock Equity

$60 million

60%

15.00%
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The weighted average cost of capital represents a firm's baseline for investment decisions and is thus conceptually appealing
as the basis for discounting lost profits. Under contemporary
finance theory, firms seek to maximize shareholder wealth.65 If a
firm finances in the proportions specified in the formula and
accepts only those projects yielding more than the weighted average required return, then the marketplace will recognize that the
company's returns should outpace its costs. Accordingly, investors
will want to share in this boon, the market price of the stock
should rise, and shareholders will benefit from an appreciation of
their holdings."
A court could simply appropriate this weighted average rate
to discount lost future profits.67 The cost of capital represents a
rate of return that companies will try to earn to satisfy their
owners and stay in business. A judge or jury can thus rest assured that the company will invest its profits at this minimum
rate. Accordingly, discounting future profits by the cost of capital
will effectively compensate the injured party.
Although theoretically appealing, the cost-of-capital approach
contains a number of practical pitfalls. First, experts reign over
cost-of-capital analysis. Complex calculations, critical assumptions, and practical finesse constitute the financial expert's
work.6" While judges and juries may understand the theory,

TOTALS

WACC: I [(2) x (3)]

$100 million

100%

-

-

12.30%

See id at 24142.
5 For a discussion of this fundamental postulate of finance, see id at 6-8.
6Id
at 244.
' See, for example, Fishman v Estate of Wirtz, 807 F2d 520, 580-81 (7th Cir 1986)
(Easterbrook dissenting) (arguing for the use of the plaintiff's cost of capital as the appropriate discount rate in a tortious interference with prospective advantage dispute);
Northern CaliforniaPower Agency v FERC, 37 F3d 1517, 1522-23 (DC Cir 1994) (finding
that a utility's cost of capital was the appropriate basis for a 15-percent discount rate
used by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in a relicensing dispute).
6
See Michel and Shaked, 19 J Bus Fin & Acct at 455-60 (cited in note 57) for a case
study measuring the cost of capital for a liquor distributor in a breach-of-contract dispute.
The article reveals the many formulae, calculations, and assumptions that the finance
team employed to figure out the appropriate discount rate based on the business's cost of
capital. Except for basic statistical regression analyses, the mathematics were generally
limited to simple algebra. The choice of appropriate formulae and proper data, however,
required significant experience and strong financial intuition. Indeed, as the authors note
in their analysis, as compared to calculating lost cash flows, the "cost of capital was less
straightforward." Id at 457.
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they generally lack the training and intuition necessary to understand the underlying methodology.69
Second, the cost-of-capital theory requires a number of assumptions with regard to risk that are "extremely binding" and
reduce its effectiveness as a predictive model.7" Ultimately, the
theory assumes that all the projects of a firm enjoy the same
level of risk and that the firm will only accept a new project that
bears an equivalent level of risk. 1 If each investment bore the
same risk, each would earn the same rate of return, and the
firm's overall cost of capital would be the appropriate baseline for
investment decisions. 2 In the everyday life of firms that must
deal with investment proposals of varying risk, however, "the use
of an overall required rate of return is inappropriate."7" Instead,
a real firm will calculate a required rate of return for specific
investment proposals, and this rate will not necessarily correlate
with the firm's overall cost of capital. Accordingly, judges and
juries cannot be assured that a firm's cost of capital is truly its
baseline for investment decisions.74
Third, the methodology allows for manipulation. Each variable in this long and complex process involves important decisions on what data to use and what approximations to make.7"

' Michel and Shaked reveal that in their analysis, "the legal team suggested that the
simpler the model, the more positive effect it will have on the judicial decision." Id at 458.
"' Van Home, FinancialManagement at 246 (cited in note 62).
71 Id.
72 For a discussion of how risk and return are directly related, see text accompanying

notes 106-12.
71 Van Home, FinancialManagement at 246 (cited in note 62).
7 One might argue that if a broken contract covered a specific project for which the
injured company had calculated an expected return, the fact finder could then defer to the
failed project's specific rate of return as the appropriate discount rate. But this specific
rate of return may still undercompensate the injured party if, at the time of the damage
award, the injured party is no longer able to earn the same return. Moreover, ambiguity
still plagues the cost-of-capital analysis for the specific project, allowing for manipulation
and a repeat of the legal lottery. Accordingly, this proposal would not serve as a proper
default rule even if such information were in fact available to the fact finder.
7 Michel and Shaked provide an honest description of their reasoning process and reveal how difficult it is to fit reality into financial categories. 19 J Bus Fin & Acct at 455-60
(cited in note 57). Indeed, the authors reveal that:
[D]eriving a reliable estimate of a damage claim necessitates the use of numerous aspects of financial theory. The expert testimony presented in this paper includes the
application of methodologies such as analyzing the yield curve, using the capital
asset pricing model, determining the cost of capital, and applying the appropriate
cost of capital framework.

Id at 455. Their practice is as much an art as it is a science.
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Experts have no fixed standard by which to judge their work, and
thus they may be creative in reaching their results.76 Accordingly, "reasoned applications of financial and economic theory may
produce different, yet defensible, results."77
Ultimately, the cost-of-capital model's conceptual appeal
weakens with its attendant costs. Experts are expensive, judges
and juries will rarely understand their methods, and parties
must invest in an uncorrelated chance that the fact finder will
believe one expert over another, or perhaps split the difference.7" In the meantime, commercial parties must deal with this
uncertainty and the distorted settlement incentives it produces. 79 If this were a voluntary investment decision, commercial
parties would undoubtedly avoid it altogether.
B. Internal Rate of Return
Another conceptually appealing measure is a company's
internal rate of return ("IRR") for the project covered by the broken contract. The IRR "is the average percentage rate per period
that invested dollars are earning."" For a specific project, its
computation yields a "discount rate such that the sum of the
present values of expenditures will equal the sum of the present
values of returns from the investment."8 ' The resulting rate of
return is then compared to a "threshold" or "hurdle" rate to judge
the investment's feasibility.82 The IRR thus seems appropriate

7 See text accompanying notes 57-60.
Lanzillotti and Esquibel, 5 J Acct Aud & Fin at 141 (cited in note 45).
78 Certainly, this probabilistic return is an aspect of expert testimony in any area of
the law. This Section is intended to demonstrate, however, that in the case of choosing a
discount rate in a commercial-contract dispute, expert testimony may not be necessary or
even particularly helpful. Rather, courts could avoid inflicting unnecessary uncertainty
and expense on commercial parties by adopting a default rule that eliminated the need for
experts.
For a discussion of settlement incentives, see text accompanying notes 146-49.
so Kenneth J. Boudreaux and Hugh W. Long, The Basic Theory of CorporateFinance
31 (Prentice-Hall 1977).
8' Cuff, Present Value, LA Lawyer at 26 (cited in note 58). In other words, the IRR is
"that discount rate X such that the sum of all the positive cash flows discounted at X and
negative cash flows discounted at X will equal zero." Id. See also Van Home, Financial
Management at 141 (cited in note 62) (defining IRR as the "discount rate that equates the
present value of the expected cash outflows with the present value of the expected inflows").
8' See James E. Hodder and Henry E. Riggs, Pitfalls in evaluating risky projects, 63
Harv Bus Rev 128, 130 (Jan-Feb 1985) (applying and criticizing IRR techniques); Van
Home, Financial Management at 142 (cited in note 62) (noting that "It]he acceptance
criterion generally employed with the intemnal-rate-of-return method is to compare the
internal rate of return with a required rate of return, known also as the cutoff, or hurdle,
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as the rate with which to discount lost profits because it represents the break-even return that a company expects to receive on
the investment that it made in the breached contract.
Financial experts, however, avoid using this measure to
discount future profits, and courts should not be fooled into accepting it as the appropriate discount rate. First, the IRR is a
method for evaluating projects, not calculating discount rates.
Second, even as a method of evaluation, the IRR suffers from a
number of pitfalls. Rates of return on investments change over
time, and thus "[o]nly rarely will the internal rate of return calculated represent the relevant rate for reinvestment of intermediate cash flows."83 Second, calculation of the IRR is highly complex: normal algebra is of no assistance, and even "calculators
and computers that solve for internal rates of return do so by
trial and error."' Finally, "the choice of the threshold rate of
return is arbitrary in nature and is specific to each particular investment." 5 Accordingly, the IRR methodology presents comparate").
3 Van Home, FinancialManagement at 147 (cited in note 62). See also Cuff, Present
Value, LA Lawyer at 27 (cited in note 58).
" Cuff, Present Value, LA Lawyer at 26 (cited in note 58). The formula can be represented mathematically as:

A,
A

o

=-

A2

A.

+..

(1 + r)'

(1+ r)

+ r)

where A.is the initial expenditure or cash outlay, n is the period when the investment
will generate cash flows, A, through A represents expected cash inflows, and r is the discount rate that equates these outflows and inflows. See Van Home, Financial Management at 22-24 (cited in note 62).
Ordinarily, one cannot perfectly equate the present value of disparate cash flows.
One discount rate might make one cash flow slightly greater than the other; another rate
might make the same cash flow slightly less than the other. Parties must thus choose
whichever one they think approximates equivalency. Cuff explains:
There can be many solutions to the discount rate, some of which may seem like nonsense. It is not unusual for there to be both positive and negative interest rates that
will solve the internal-rate-of-return equation.... It will be important to specify the
specific range of acceptable values.... Otherwise, you may end up in a legal dispute
over a high order mathematical equation.
Cuff, Present Value, LA Lawyer at 26-27 (cited in note 58).
' Gilbert, 4 J Legal Econ at 42 (cited in note 16). See also Cuff, Present Value, LA
Lawyer at 27 (cited in note 58):
An investment with a 15 percent internal rate of return is not necessarily better than
an investment with a 10 percent rate of return; in fact, the 10 percent may be better.
This can depend on the investor's return on invested funds, the risk of the invest-
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nies with multiple, difficult-to-calculate, and somewhat arbitrary
solutions. Financial experts generally avoid this method to measure future damages and so should the legal system.
C. Coerced-Loan Theory
Some commentators have suggested that when the defendant
owes the plaintiff money for a breach of contract, the plaintiff in
effect becomes a creditor of the defendant. Accordingly, the proper discount rate should be based on the defendant's general cost
of debt, or on a particular debt instrument that replicates the
plaintiff's position as a "creditor.""6 Thus, a court must consider
the defendant's cost of capital or find the interest rate that the
defendant would pay voluntary creditors who took the same position in the capital structure as the plaintiff involuntarily took. 7
Although interesting as an analogy, this approach fails as a
proper default rule for contract disputes. First, a discount rate
based on the defendant's cost of debt does not measure what the
plaintiff might earn on its own investments. The plaintiff had no
choice in becoming a forced creditor of the defendant, and perhaps could have obtained a more attractive investment elsewhere. Accordingly, its coerced "loan" to the defendant does not

ment, and the relationship between the investment and the investor's other investments.
' See James M. Patell, Roman L. Wel, and Mark A- Wolfson, Accumulating Damages in Litigation: The Roles of Uncertainty and Interest Rates, 11 J Legal Stud 341, 342
(1982). Although Patell, Wel, and Wolfson apply the coerced-loan model to presettlement
interest (the interest accrued between breach and settlement date), this model is also
applicable to discounting future streams of income. Indeed, some courts now use it to
value creditor claims in bankruptcy reorganization proceedings. See Michael E.S. Frankel,
Comment, The Emerging Fixed Cramdown Rate Regime: A Market-Driven Argument for
Effective Fixed Rates in Bankruptcy Cramdown, 2 U Chi L Sch Roundtable 643, 648-49
(1995) (examining various circuit courts' use of the coerced-loan theory to value creditor
claims in reorganization "cramdown" proceedings).
s' The plaintiff's position as a voluntary creditor, and the interest rate that it accordingly enjoys as a creditor, will ultimately depend upon its hypothetical priority in
bankruptcy. Thus, a court will have to work backward from bankruptcy, viewing the
plaintiff as a voluntary creditor taking part in the defendant's capital structure, to determine the interest rate that the plaintiff should earn on its lost profits. The court could
then use this number as the discount rate. See Michael S. Knoll, A Primer on Prejudgment Interest 18-22 (unpublished manuscript on file with U Chi L Rev). In reorganization
proceedings, this analysis is relatively straightforward because the plaintiff is already a
secured creditor, and courts merely have to determine the going rate for similar loans in
the particular region. See, for example, In re Hardzog, 901 F2d 858, 860 (10th Cir 1990)
(finding that "the current market rate used for similar loans in the region" is the appropriate discount rate to find the present value of secured claims under the coerced-loan
theory).
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represent a decision to funnel excess capital into projects that
earn the best possible returns to maximize shareholder wealth.
The plaintiff has contracted for services or goods, not to become
an investor in the defendant's enterprise.
Second, the model is difficult to implement in practice. Measuring the discount rate by the defendant's cost of capital is subject to the same failings as measuring by the plaintiff's cost of
capital, analyzed above."8 Alternatively, trying to categorize the
plaintiff as a specific creditor is a complex and confusing endeavor. 9 Should the court liken the plaintiff to a senior creditor or
an unsubordinated debenture holder? Is the plaintiff's claim
similar to a callable or convertible bond? Should the interest rate
be fixed or floating? No court is prepared to answer these questions on its own and experts can haggle over each and every
element. Theoretically unsound and practically unmanageable,
the coerced-loan model is thus inappropriate as a contract default
rule.
D. Capitalization Factor
Some experts completely bypass the present-value mechanics
and the discount-rate debate by divining a simple market capitalization multiple to discount the stream of future losses." "The
capitalization of earnings from a business enterprise represents
an attempt to determine the value of a going business."9 Accordingly, "[a] capitalization factor is the ratio of the value of a
stream of continuing income to the current amount of the stream;
for example, if a firm is worth $1 million and its current earnings
are $100,000, its capitalization factor is ten."9 2 Like the price-to-

"
See Section II.A. Note also that the defendant's breach may reflect a shaky financial condition that the financial markets have already internalized. Accordingly, the
defendant's cost of capital may be high because its ability to operate as a going concern is
uncertain. The appropriate discount rate under the coerced-loan model will therefore be
high, reducing the plaintiff's damage award to a low present value. Thus, the reasoning
behind the damage award would fail to reflect how the plaintiff may actually invest the

finds.
' See Knoll, Primeron Prejudgment Interest at 19-36 (cited in note 87), for a discussion of how a court should choose the appropriate prejudgment interest rate under this
model.
'o See generally Allen S. Joslyn, Measures of Damagesfor the Destruction of a Business, 48 Brooklyn L Rev 431 (1982); Robert E. Hall and Victoria A. Lazear, Reference
Guide on Estimation of Economic Losses in Damages Awards, in Reference Manual on
Scientific Evidence 471, 497 (Fed Jud Center 1994).
"' Joslyn, 48 Brooklyn L Rev at 456 n 93 (cited in note 90), citing Arthur Stone
Dewing, 1 The FinancialPolicy of Corporations287 (Ronald 5th ed 1953).
' Hall and Lazear, Reference Guide at 498 (cited in note 90).
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earnings ratio used in evaluating stocks,93 the capitalization factor basically measures the amount of money that investors are
willing to pay for each dollar of current income of a company.
Experts generally calculate this measure by using the injured company's accounting records and the market values of
comparable businesses.94 The figure is then adjusted by factors
such as "the general economic outlook, the outlook for the specific
industry, the past history of the business in general, and the
prospect that the business will continue."95 Once an expert has
computed this "cap factor," the value of the loss is easy to determine: simply multiply the capitalization factor by the current
profit from the broken contract." Accordingly, experts can avoid
the normal present value methodology and value future profits
with market information and simple multiplication.
Courts have found this method intuitively appealing in analogous settings. Because the cap factor approximates the amount
that investors are willing to pay for a dollar of current income,
courts can simply defer to how the market values a company's
future earnings and avoid a subjective determination of what
value the company itself expects to gain from its earnings. Many
courts have followed this rationale in awarding lost earnings for
antitrust violations, applying the cap-factor analysis to plaintiffs

" The price-to-earnings ratio is the ratio of the current market price of a stock to its
earnings per share. See Diamond, FinancialAccounting at 710 (cited in note 20). Experts
often appropriate this well known financial measure to derive the appropriate capitalization factor. See Joslyn, 48 Brooklyn L Rev at 457 n 98 (cited in note 90).
" Joslyn, 48 Brooklyn L Rev at 457 (cited in note 90).
9' Id.
Hall and Lazear offer the following example:
(1) Ratio of market value to current annual earnings in comparable

13

publicly traded firms:
(2) Plaintiff's lost earnings over past year:

$200

(3) Value of future lost earnings [(1) x (2)]:

$2600

Reference Manual at 498 (cited in note 90).
One can construe the example above as representing a five-year contract where the
injured party expected $200 of profit per year. An expert would then use all financial

information-including the term of the contract-to calculate the cap factor. A court could
then simply multiply the factor by the first year's expected profits to find the profits due
to the injured party upon breach.
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as diverse as automobile-part-distributors97 and Sony product
dealers.98
Despite its practical and intuitive simplicity, this methodology is inapt for breach-of-contract awards. A capitalization factor
appraises the market value of a company's future stream of income as if the company were being sold. This method misses the
mark of measurement: courts are concerned with how the plaintiff can invest an award today to reach a certain sum tomorrow,
not how the market values this sum. The latter measures what
the market expects to earn on an investment in the plaintiff, the
former measures what the plaintiff expects to earn on the market. Contract law, however, generally focuses only on how the
plaintiff can voluntarily invest the damage award.9 Thus, like
the coerced-loan theory, the capitalization method approaches the
discounting of damages from the wrong perspective.'
Furthermore, the capitalization method involves all the costs
of the cost-of-capital method but adds no new benefits.'' Parties must use experts to calculate the appropriate multipliers,
thus increasing litigation costs.0 2 Moreover, "parties may dispute almost every element of the capitalization calculation," including "whether there is reliable evidence that the capitalization
factor accurately measures value for the specific asset or business." O3 Accordingly, the battle of the experts will produce disparate results at great cost and the parties will once again face
uncertainty. Courts should therefore refrain from adopting this
approach as the default rule.'

' See Tires Sales Corp v Cities Service Oil Co., 637 F2d 467, 476 (7th Cir 1980)
(overruling district court's acceptance for directed verdict of a 9.25 cap factor to discount
the lost earnings of a wholesale distributor of automobile accessories, but only because the
issue should have been presented to the jury).
98 See Eiberger v Sony Corp of America, 459 F Supp 1276, 1289 (S D NY 1978)
(applying a cap factor of fifty to a Sony products dealer). For other examples of courts
using the cap-factor method in antitrust cases, see Vandervelde v Put & Call Brokers &
DealersAssociation, 344 F Supp 118, 152 (S D NY 1972) (applying a multiple of three to
discount the future earnings of a broker business); Taxi Weekly, Inc. v Metropolitan
Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc., 539 F2d 907, 914-15 (2d Cir 1976) (upholding a jury verdict
that accepted an expert's cap factor of ten).
See notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
'® For a discussion of how the coerced-loan theory takes the wrong perspective, see
Section II.C.
"'
For a discussion of the faults of the cost-of-capital method, see Section II.A
"o Joslyn notes that under the cap-factor analysis, "the plaintiff will need expert
testimony regarding the proper rate of capitalization." 48 Brooklyn L Rev at 456 (cited in
note 90).
" Hall and Lazear, Reference Manual at 498 (cited in note 90).
...See Meyer, Fitzgerald, and Moini, 4 J Legal Econ at 31 (cited in note 57) (conclud-
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E. Capital Asset Pricing Model
Finally, one group of financial experts has recently proposed
an adjusted capital-asset-pricing model ("CAPM") to calculate the
appropriate discount rate.' Pioneered by William Sharpe,"°c
the CAPM suggests that the return of an asset (A.) is influenced
by the prevailing risk-free rate (R.) (usually the United States
Treasury bill rate), the market return (Rm) (perhaps the return
on the Standard & Poor's
500), and the covariance'. between 1.
08
and Rm (0) as follows:
1R. = Rr + Oj(Rm - Rr),

where
cov( .,Rm)
var(Rm)
The CAPM measures what is intuitively obvious to most investors: the greater the unavoidable risk of a security (the risk that
cannot be diversified away), the greater the return that an investor will expect from this security."° The correlation, or sensitivity, between a security's excess returns and the market's excess
returns as a whole is measured by beta (0)."o If j3 = 1, then the
stock's excess returns vary proportionally with the market's returns; if 3 > 1, then the stock's returns vary more than proportionally; and if 3 < 1, then the stock's returns vary less than proportionally. Thus, the greater the beta, the greater the risk, and
the greater the expected return."'
ing that the cap-factor method of determining damages "while being simple is probably
inaccurate").
1" See id at 27. Lanzillotti and Esquibel appear to refer to this type of method when
they suggest that the proper approach is the "cost of capital adjusted to the risk of the
project." 5 J Acct Aud & Fin at 132 (cited in note 45).
"06See generally William F. Sharpe, CapitalAsset Prices:A Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions of Risk, 19 J Fin 425 (1964).
"o "Covariance" is a statistical measure that essentially means "to vary with." In the
example, 0, measures how a certain security's return 1A, may "vary with" the market as a
whole.
106 See Jeff Madura, FinancialMarkets and Institutions 205 (West 2d ed 1992).
106 See Van Home, FinancialManagement at 64 (cited in note 62).
110 Id at 66.

"' "Ahigher beta reflects a higher covariance between an asset's returns and market
returns, which contributes more risk to the portfolio of assets held by the investor."
Madura, FinancialMarkets at 205 (cited in note 108). Accordingly, an investor will want
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Viewing the firm's assets as a portfolio of investments, experts can apply the CAPM to discount lost profits." Risky projects with uncertain profits are like risky securities: their unique
risk may be diversified away, but "[tlhe higher the
[nondiversifiable] risk, the greater the expected return that will
be required by an investor/firm.""' Thus, when a project fails
because a defendant breaches, "it is necessary to compute the
risk associated with these lost profits and appropriately adjust
the discount rate in order to neither over nor undercompensate
the plaintiff.""' The CAPM measures the relationship between
nondiversifiable risk and return and thus can be adjusted for use
in measuring the lost profits of a particular project. By replacing
the market rate (Rm) with the weighted average cost of capital of
the injured party and calculating a beta that measures the correlation between the lost-profit and total-profit returns, the CAPM
can generate the appropriate discount rate."5

compensation for taking on this increased risk, and compensation will come from a higher
required return from the risky asset.
112 See Meyer, Fitzgerald, and Moini, 4 J Legal Econ at 35-38 (cited in note 57).
3 Id at 39.
114 Id at 38-39.
"' Meyer, Fitzgerald, and Moini add other refinements to their model, which results
in the following formula:

kr = lid+

-1 )

where:
1= the appropriate discount rate for the lost profits,
1r= the aftertax, risk-free interest rate on the appropriate United States Treasury
obligation,
lc = the plaintiff's aftertax weighted average cost of capital,
and
= r,. (SD,P / SDr)
where
rIPf = the correlation between the expected returns of the lost profits and the expect
ed returns of the firm's total profits,
SDI, = the standard deviation of the returns on the expected lost profits, and
SDf = the standard deviation of the returns on the firm's lost profits.
4 J Legal Econ at 36 (cited in note 57). As this formula vividly demonstrates, the financial
analysis underlying this approach is extremely complex. Indeed, it is probably too complex
for use by most courts.
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Although theoretically the most sound and precise, this approach fails as a default rule for a couple of practical reasons.
First, the CAPM is a disputed theory in finance. One recent empirical study... found no relationship between historical betas
and returns in the CAPM model, concluding that "[iln a nutshell,
market 0 seems to have no role in explaining the average returns
on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks for 1963-1990."" 7 Thus,
the very foundation of the CAPM-that it can measure, against
the backdrop of the general market, the nondiversifiable risk of
an asset and provide for that risk in the expected return-is
questionable. Accordingly, the use of this model to discount future profits is also questionable."'
Second, application of this method is an administrative
nightmare. Not only does it require a calculation of the cost of
capital, it also requires more difficult calculations to conjure up a
firm's beta."9 This approach involves interlocking levels of financial theory that compound the confusion of the fact finder and
allow more variation in the experts' results. It is simply too complicated and too expensive, and is perhaps the paradigmatic
reason why the gap between the world of law and world of finance still remains broad and deep.

III. ENDING THE LEGAL LOTTERY: THE FIXED-RATE RULE
A. Implementing the Fixed-Rate Rule
The review of case law and the expert methodologies leads to
a simple conclusion: neither triers of fact nor experts are well
positioned to choose discount rates in contract disputes between
commercial parties. The present value of a damage award, and
.1.See generally Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French, The Cross-Section of
Expected Stock Returns, 47 J Fin 427 (1992).
117 Id at 445. Fama and French also conclude that "our tests do not support the
central prediction of the SLB model [CAPM], that average stock returns are positively
related to market P." Id at 449.
118 Note also that experts often use the CAPM to measure the cost-of-equity component in the cost-of-capital approach. See Van Home, FinancialManagement at 235 (cited
in note 62) (using CAPM to calculate the cost of equity capital); Michel and Shaked, 19 J
Bus Fin & Acct at 458 (cited in note 57) (same). The weaknesses of the CAPM thus
exacerbate the weaknesses of the WACC methodology.
119 Betas for particular projects are notoriously difficult to figure out. The difficulty
lies not in applying basic statistical formulae, but in digging up the data on the firm's
total-profit standard deviation and lost-profit deviation and then finding the covariance
between these data. Meyer, Fitzgerald, and Moini present a hypothetical example without
going through this statistical labyrinth and fail to apply this formula to a real situation. 4
J Legal Econ at 35-38 (cited in note 57).
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consequently the selection of a discount rate, depends on a finding of fact by the judge or jury. Experts, however, govern the
courtroom with alluring rationales and finely tuned formulae.
The selection of discount rates has moved out of the bounds of
the law, into disputed areas of social science and beyond the
understanding of most of the key parties involved. Indeed, one
court has warned that discount-rate determinations should not be
allowed to convert the courtroom into a "graduate seminar on
economic forecasting,"2 ' but few have heeded this caveat. Predictability and intelligible arguments have yielded to linear regression analyses and risk evaluation almost without a second
thought.
Without the experts, however, courts cannot employ the
complex methods reviewed above. Most judges and juries have
neither the time nor the capacity to make informed choices of
discount rates. Whereas the proposed finance methodologies at
least take a structured approach to developing the proper discount rate, prevailing decisional law reveals little structure and
too much inconsistency. The discretionary discount-rate regime
has produced random results that aggravate the harm to injured
commercial parties. Millions of dollars ride on decisions that
judges and juries are not well suited to make.
Ultimately, the parties themselves should choose the appropriate discount rate or contractually define the parameters for
making this choice. To avoid the legal lottery, commercial parties
and fact finders must recognize that "in contract the damages
payable should be set by agreement and not by any abstract
principles of justice, however pleasing and symmetrical they
might appear to judges."' Accordingly, most would agree that
"[tihe best approach is to state with precision the present value
formula that you wish to use when drafting a contract."
Indeed, the Restatement (Second) of Property suggests that, in
lease disputes, courts recognize a liquidated-damages clause as a
fair and reasonable estimation of damages only when the clause

m Doca v Marina Mercante Nicaraguense,S-A, 634 F2d 30, 39 (2d Cir 1980).
Richard A. Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability:ConsequentialDamages in the Law of
Contract, 18 J Legal Stud 105, 108 (1989). Epstein also notes that for remedial purposes,

"[d]amage rules are no different from any other terms of a contract. They should be
understood solely as default provisions subject to variation by contract. The operative
rules should be chosen by the parties for their own purposes, not by the law for its purposes." Id.
' Cuff, Present Value, LA Lawyer at 26 (cited in note 58).
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includes a process for discounting.' Good drafting can end the
legal lottery before it begins.
But where contracts are silent, the legal system must fill the
gaps and provide a default rule that will resolve the discount dilemma. This duty is complicated, however, and courts (perhaps
understandably) have failed to dispatch it adequately. By putting
forth varying, discretionary discount rates, courts have subjected
commercial parties to unnecessary expense and uncertainty. A
clear and simple default rule, however, could eliminate the legal
lottery even for those parties who fail to resolve the discount
dilemma in their contracts.
Courts should adopt a fixed rate, or a rate pegged to an easily identifiable market measure, as the default rule for selecting
discount rates. For example, a fact finder could quickly and easily
select a rate pegged to the investment-grade corporate-bond index published by the Wall Street Journal on the date of
breach.'
Courts would then achieve certainty and clarity at
lower cost.12 5
The medium-quality corporate-bond index probably is the
appropriate market peg for the fixed-rate regime." This rate
23 Restatement (Second) of Property, Landlord and Tenant § 12.1 comment k (1977).

At least two jurisdictions have implemented this rule. See Walter Implement, Inc. v Focht,
42 Wash App 104, 709 P2d 1215, 1219 (1985), quoting United Leasing & FinancialServices, Inc. v R.F. Optical, Inc., 103 Wis 2d 488, 309 NW2d 23, 27 (Wis App 1981) ("Discounting has been recognized as the second operative element of a fair liquidated damages
clause.").
" Medium-quality corporate bonds are bonds rated by Moody's Investment Services
as Baa or by Standard & Poor's as BBB. They represent the lowest form of investmentgrade bonds-those bonds in which commercial banking institutions can invest as regulated by law. See Madura, Financial Markets at 85 (cited in note 108). The Wall Street
Journal publishes a daily floating index of corporate rates compiled by Merrill Lynch.
This index includes a listing for medium-quality corporate bonds. For example, on January 3, 1996, the medium-quality corporate bonds of durations less than ten years were
earning 6.23 percent and the same bonds of durations ten years or more were earning
7.31 percent. Wall St J C20 (Jan 3, 1996).
' In practice, judges should defer to this fixed rate when they act as fact finders in
discount-rate determinations. Similarly, when juries act as the fact finders, judges should
instruct the jury to apply the fixed rate. Accordingly, the fixed-rate regime could be
judicially implemented as the appropriate default rule. Of course, judicial implementation
of the fixed-rate default rule is only an interim solution; ultimately, state commercial
codes should incorporate the fixed-rate regime to convert what is now a finding of fact into
a question of law.
"' Some legal theorists argue that "courts should concern themselves not so much
with the substance of the legal rule as with its certainty and predictability." Richard
Craswell, ContractRemedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory ofEfficient Breach, 61 S Cal L
Rev 629, 632 (1988). Accordingly, it does not matter what market peg the courts pick, so
long as they consistently defer to that rate in contract disputes. This Comment, however,
will try to do more and justify the investment-grade rate as the most appropriate fixed
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accords with the general standard that, to properly compensate
an injured party, discounting should reflect the rate of return at
which the party can invest the damage award. 7 The corporatebond rate is a compromise between the returns generated by
riskless government
securities and the less predictable stock
2 8
market.
Riskless government securities present too low a rate of
return for corporate entities. Although individuals may be held to
a low level of investment savvy when investing damage
awards, 9 corporate entities can be expected to exercise considerably greater prowess. Given their mandate to maximize shareholder wealth, corporate entities will likely use their financial
and managerial expertise to attain returns greater than those
available from low-risk government securities.
At the other end of the spectrum, the stock market, while
boasting much higher rates of return,30 is also not the appropriate market peg. Historical rates of stock market returns do
not necessarily predict the future, and thus cannot serve as an
accurate market peg. The stock market is subject to daily and
yearly variations that spell bust for some and boon for others.
These variations are formally unpredictable and thus the rate of
return is unknown in advance.'' The plaintiff's rate of invest-

rate.
See text accompanying notes 21-24.
In the 1980s, the Standard & Poor's 500 earned an average annual return of 17.5
percent while Treasury Bills earned an average annual return of 8.9 percent. Long-term
corporate bonds earned 13 percent, falling roughly midway between the stock market and
risk-free securities. See Peter Lynch, Beating the Street 17 (Simon & Schuster 1994).
12 The Supreme Court, in Kelly, 241 US at 490, held that courts should not hold
injured tort victims to a high level of investment prowess:
'

It may be that such [high] rates are not obtainable upon investments on safe securities, at least without the exercise of financial experience and skill in the administration of the fund; and it is evident that the compensation should be awarded upon a
basis that does not call upon the beneficiaries to exercise such skill, for where this is
necessarily employed the interest return is in part earned by the investor rather
than by the investment.
Corporations, however, are built around maximizing the "financial experience" of management, and thus should be called upon to exercise this skill.
"o Peter Lynch, one of the most successful mutual fund managers in history, remarks,
'[b]y sticking with stocks all the time, the odds are six to one in our favor that we'll do
better than the people who stick with bonds." Lynch, Beating the Street at 16 (cited in
note 128). Lynch also notes that over the years 1926-89, "a $100,000 investment in longterm government bonds would now be worth $1.6 million whereas the same amount
invested in the S&P 500 would be worth $25.5 million." Id.
131 According to the semi-strong form of the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis,
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ment should not be pegged to such an uncertain measure of financial success.132
Medium-grade corporate bonds provide a compromise. They
generate a return greater than riskless securities and high-quality corporate debt, but are still sanctioned as stable investments."3 Moreover, these bonds are debt instruments, and
thus, unlike stocks, their rate of return is generally fixed for the
period of investment."3 By combining the financial expertise of
a corporation with the need for certainty, the medium-grade bond
rate emerges as the best peg for the fixed default rate.
B. Justifying the Fixed-Rate Rule
Before a court chooses this market peg, however, it must first
face a more fundamental question: why adopt a fixed rate at all?
A new legal rule must justify itself as an expansion and not a
contraction of social welfare; in other words, the benefits of the
new rule to both the parties and society must exceed its attendant costs. Ultimately an empirical question, cost-benefit analysis
security price movements quickly internalize all public information and engage in a
random walk, or unpatterned changes in price. Thus, "one cannot use past security prices
to predict future prices in such a way as to profit on average." Van Home, Financial
Management at 51 (cited in note 62). At least one portfolio manager, however, believes
that stock investments still generate comparatively better returns than other financial
investments. See Lynch, Beating the Street at 15-16 (cited in note 128) ("[S]ooner or later,
a portfolio of stocks or stock mutual funds will turn out to be a lot more valuable than a
portfolio of bonds or CD's or money-market funds.").
1
One could argue that if judgment is handed down, on average, two years after
breach, the fact finder should use the injured party's aggregate real rate of return on investments for those two years to discount the lost profits for those same years. But this
approach replicates many of the problems of the discretionary regime. First, expensive
experts will need to define the parameters of a company's "aggregate rate of return" and
then will have to conjure up the rate from complicated financial and accounting data.
Moreover, parties will not know what rate will apply for those two years until the experts
battle before the fact finder and thus will have to bear the costs of an uncertain rate.
Finally, the fact finder must still select the appropriate rate for the remaining term of the
contract, and thus the historical rate can be only a partial solution at best. It would seem
better to avoid all this expense and uncertainty by fixing the rate at the date of breach.
1
One investment-ratings service described medium-quality corporate bonds as
"neither highly protected nor poorly secured ....
Such bonds lack outstanding investment
characteristics and in fact have speculative characteristics as well." CorporateBond RatingsExplanation and Key, Moody's Bond Record 2, 3 (Dec 1995). Thus, these types of bonds
represent a median type of investment yield that an injured corporate party could expect
to enjoy.
'"' Courts can roughly divide the universe of broken contracts into long-term contracts
(greater than ten years) and short-term contracts (less than ten years). This division
accords with the division of medium-quality bonds in the Wall Street Journal index.
Courts can then lift the appropriate discount rate from the bond index based on the
remaining life of the contract.
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can still draw from common-sense observations to reach a
plausible conclusion. In this case, parties and society as a whole
would get more for their money under a fixed standard than they
do under the discretionary system now in place.
1. Benefits of the fixed rate.
First, a move to a fixed rate does not represent any quantum
leap and will not upset party expectations. In tort law, courts
basically defer to the risk-free rate when discounting lost future
earnings... and some states have even fixed the rate by
statute." 6 Moreover, at least one commentator has advocated
the use of a fixed rate in "cramdowns" in bankruptcy reorganizations." 7 In the contract setting, one court, in a dispute over
an involuntary conversion of a mining lease, used a rate fixed by
the Bureau of Land Management in its appraisal guide to discount the value of the lease. 3 ' Given these incremental movements toward a fixed-rate regime, and the great expense and
uncertainty parties face in the prevailing discretionary regime, a
court adopting a fixed rate would be neither a lonely pioneer nor
a bumbling fool. Rather, it would simply be extending a sensible
methodology to an area of the law crying out for reform." 9
Second, fixing the discount rate "reduces the associated uncertainty and, therefore, the costs of administering the remedial
provisions." "' A fixed rate such as the investment-grade bond
rate merely requires the fact finder to open the Wall Street Journal and read a simple chart.'" Fact finders could dispose of ex-

1

See Meyer, Fitzgerald, and Moini, 4 J Legal Econ at 28 (cited in note 57) (noting

that in lost-earning cases, "courts have treated future earnings as basically risk free");
Richard A. Posner, Law and the Theory of Finance: Some Intersections, 54 Geo Wash L
Rev 159, 161 (1986) (noting that in compensating for lost future earnings, "(tihe tendency
is to use a riskless interest rate in discounting lost future earnings to present value").
1
See note 37. Indeed, some expert commentators have counseled other experts to
use the "prevailing [risk-free] investment rate" in discounting tort losses because this rate
"greatly simplifies the entire analysis by eliminating the interest rate forecasting process,
the results of which tend to be a point of controversy in cases of alleged economic losses."
Ledford and Zocco, 36 Fed'n Ins & Corp Couns Q at 39-40 (cited in note 5).
,s See Frankel, Comment, 2 U Chi L Sch Roundtable at 644 (cited in note 86).
See Whitney Benefits, Inc. v United States, 18 C1 Ct 394, 412-13 (1989).
' At least one expert commentator appears to advise other experts to adopt this
"functional approach" to selecting a discount rate. See Blair, 8 Franchise L J at 23 (cited
in note 4) ("To avoid the appearance of selecting an interest rate arbitrarily, one may use
an average or index rate. For example, Barron's 'Best Grade' and 'Interim Grade' bond
yields provide an average rate on bonds of comparable quality.").
140 See Epstein, 18 J Legal Stud at 118 (cited in note 121).
1 In Binghamton Masonic Temple, Inc. v City of Binghamton, the court basically fol-
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perts and their fancy formulae, saving incalculable time and
expense."" Such ease of administration would also lighten the
decisional burdens of judges, allowing them to focus on matters
of contract law that they are specifically trained to examine. In
this way, a fixed rate would benefit society by decreasing deadweight litigation costs and magnifying the comparative advantage of the courts.
Third, a fixed rate would reduce the direct litigation costs of
the disputants. Parties would spend less on experts by avoiding
the long and expensive financial analysis underlying most discount-rate methodologies." Moreover, legal fees may lighten as
expert preparation and testimony become unnecessary. Accordingly, lawyers could focus more on crafting legal arguments
(something they are trained to do), and less on manipulating financial analysis (something most would have to learn to do). The
parties would pay less for a better product.
Fourth, the fixed rate is a clear and predictable default rule.
It provides a fixed starting point around which parties may contract if they deem it unsatisfactory.' Indeed, it may lower the
cost of contracting by setting a baseline for bargaining. Thus,
contract law should adopt this simple rule and allow contract
parties to invent alternatives to meet their particular needs.
Fifth, the fixed-rate rule would allow parties to better insure
against the cost of breach in the substantive terms of their contracts. Some parties might not bargain around the default rule
but instead use it as a baseline to price their contracts ex ante.
Most contracts contain some kind of premium for the expected
loss from breach.'4 5 Under the discretionary discount regime,

lowed this approach in a breach-of-contract dispute, although it deferred to the risk-free
rate instead of the corporate-bond rate. 158 Misc 2d 916, 602 NYS2d 310, 313 (NY Sup Ct
1993). The court found that the risk-free rate of United States Treasury bills should be
used to discount payments from a broken loan agreement because this rate "represents a
safe and ascertainable rate of return available for a plaintiff's financial recovery." Id. The
court then used the New York Times financial pages to find the rate for fifteen-year
United States Treasury bills and used that rate to discount the lost income from the
broken loan agreement. Id.
12 Of course, experts probably will still have a say in the aggregate calculation of lost
profits, where a fixed rule would make no sense. But experts, parties, and fact finders
alike will not need to spend the additional time and energy on choosing the appropriate
discount rate, and that in itself is a benefit.
1
For a discussion of how complicated this analysis can be, see notes 68 and 75.
" See Craswell, 61 S Cal L Rev at 632-33 (cited in note 126) (noting the effects of
remedial legal rules on contract negotiations).
145 Id at 640-42 (discussing how parties include damage considerations when negotiating price terms).
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parties must make rough and arbitrary estimates of how to account for this indeterminable liability in the price of the contract.
The discretionary regime may also increase transaction costs, as
parties have more to haggle over when pricing the contract. A
fixed-rate regime would provide parties with more information
about their potential liability, leaving the parties to better set
their breach premiums, as well as potentially facilitating the
initial contract negotiations. Accordingly, a fixed rate would allow
parties to better account for the expected value of loss ex ante.
Finally, a fixed discount rate might bring the parties closer
together in settlement. Uncertainty often drives the litigation
decision.'
Under the traditional economic theory of settlement,'4 7 parties subjectively evaluate the expected benefits of
going to trial and compare the benefits to their expected costs.
Parties then base their settlement offers on these evaluations,
and, under this model, parties will litigate if the plaintiff's minimum demand exceeds the defendant's maximum offer. A discretionary discount rate swells the uncertainty that feeds the litigation decision, allowing parties more room to diverge in their subjective evaluations, and thus increasing the potential for a bargaining failure."4
A fixed rate, however, would mitigate these unintended consequences. Fixing the discount rate would chip away at the uncertainty faced by disputants, bringing both parties one step
closer to full information and thus one step closer to settlement. Thus, a fixed discount rate would provide in settlement
some of the same benefits it offers in litigation: it is administra14s See Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problemsin Settlement, 16 J Legal Stud 189,

192 (1987) ("The existence of litigation is explained primarily by the uncertainty associated with a lawsuit. Litigation occurs because the parties differ in their estimates of either
the probability that plaintiff will prevail in the lawsuit, or the amount of the recovery if
plaintiff does prevail, or both.").
147 See generally Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 21.5 at 554-60
(Little, Brown 4th ed 1992); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure
and JudicialAdministration,2 J Legal Stud 399, 417-20 (1973).
" Indeed, Judge Posner himself recognizes the problems of a discretionary discount
rate. See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 21.5 at 556 (cited in note 148) (explaining
that parties may evaluate stakes differently if "the parties have different rates at which
they discount a future to a present value, which will cause their [expected judgments] to
diverge").
149 In a discretionary regime, parties waste time and energy bargaining over the
appropriate discount rate, increasing the probability of a breakdown in the bargaining
process. See Miller, 16 J Legal Stud at 193 (cited in note 146), noting that "[t]he existence
of a positive settlement range is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for settlement.
Even if the settlement range is positive ... the parties may fail to settle their dispute because of a breakdown in the bargaining process."
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ble, it is clear from the outset, and it saves the time and money
of figuring out a proper discount rate. Thus, from contract formation to settlement or litigation, a fixed-rate rule offers substantial
opportunities for lowering transaction and bargaining costs.
2. Costs of the fixed rate.
First, like any strict rule, a fixed-rate rule may be systematically over- or underinclusive. Parties who earn rates of return
higher than the fixed rate are overcompensated; parties who earn
lesser returns are undercompensated. This distortion in compensation might upset the fundamental goal of contract damages-to
give the injured party the benefit of his bargain, no more and no
less. Courts might therefore prefer to disregard a fixed-rate rule
and to continue to tailor the discount rate to the particulars of
the dispute, thereby achieving (in theory if not in fact) finely
tuned compensation.
This argument, however, does not dispose of the fixed discount rate. For one thing, it is not intuitively obvious whether
this rule, like the discretionary regime, over- or undercompensates. Contract plaintiffs are free to do whatever they wish with
the funds that they receive as damages. They may invest in
stocks, bonds, derivatives, business operations, or otherwise, and
each investment carries its own potential return. Thus, in the ex
ante position, it is not evident what investment rate the plaintiff
will earn, no matter what methodology experts employ to divine
a potential rate.' Further, exact compensation in every case is
an illusory goal. The Supreme Court has recognized that discounting is "rough and ready" approximation'' and counseled
against a search for "delusive exactness."'52 Discounting is simply an imperfect process no matter how it is done. A marketpegged fixed rate may be just as accurate on average as the
methodologies currently employed by financial experts.
Second, the marginal benefits of the discretionary discount
methodologies in minimizing the risks of over- and undercompensation probably do not exceed the marginal costs of those

' See Bridgkort Racquet Club, Inc. v University Bank, 85 Wis 2d 706, 271 NW2d 165,
170 n 9 (Wis App 1978) ('There is nothing sacred about the 7% interest rate return. It
may be that Bridgkort's choice might be to invest the money at a lower return rate. Or it
may be able to obtain even a higher rate of return. Obviously, precision in present value
computation is impossible.").
151 See Jones & Laughlin Steel, 462 US at 546.
152 Id at 552.
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methodologies. Because all discounting is admittedly imperfect,
the popular finance formulae that experts employ to "scientifically" reduce the risk of miscompensation 5 3 will likely never
achieve that goal exactly.' The costs, however, are real and
paid by the parties. Accordingly, one must ask whether the marginal benefits of a potentially more accurate, undisclosed compensation formula justify the quantifiable marginal costs that it creates. This regime must then be compared to the "rough and
ready" fixed-rate rule that captures a slew of real benefits 55
while potentially expanding the variance of the miscompensation
risk. This Comment takes a strong stand in favor of the tangible
benefits and potential costs of a fixed rate over the potential benefits and tangible costs of a discretionary system.
Finally, the fixed rate is a default rule for contracts, and
parties can contract around it if they deem it under- or
overcompensatory. Indeed, contractual provisions probably are
the best approach because they allow the parties to tailor the
legal rule to the specifics of their relationship while avoiding the
courtroom. A home-grown remedy provides the certainty of a
fixed-rate rule, avoids unnecessary litigation, and spells out party
expectations in advance. So even if this default rule does not
exactly replicate what parties would choose, a noncompensatory,
fixed discount rate may ultimately be the proper rule of compulsion that alerts parties to the perils of failing to address discounting on their own.
Another criticism of the fixed rate might be that it encourages inefficient breaches. The theory of efficient breach states that
the expectation measure of damages forces breaching parties to
internalize the plaintiff's full cost of breach. 55 Thus, parties
breach only when the total cost of breach is less than the total
benefit, thereby maximizing social welfare as goods flow to the
highest-valued user. Remedies that are noncompensatory distort
breaching decisions, drive a wedge between the social and private
optimum, and cause parties to breach too little or too much.'5 7
'" Even experts agree that "imperfect foresight regarding the future structure of
interest rates means that the exact earning ability of the corpus of an award cannot be
determined with certainty." Ledford and Zocco, 36 Fed'n Ins & Corp Couns Q at 28 (cited
in note 5).
"' Indeed, no one has engaged in an empirical study of the correlation between
discount rates and actual rates of returns enjoyed by injured parties after awards are
made.
1
For a discussion of these benefits, see Section II.B.1.
15 See generally Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 289-92 (Harper

Collins 1988); Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 4.8 at 117-26 (cited in note 147).
"7 See Craswell, 61 S Cal L Rev at 634-35 (cited in note 126), noting
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A noncompensatory, fixed discount rate could thus hurt commercial parties and society by encouraging inefficient breaches.
This efficient breach argument, however, is unpersuasive.
First, as the discussion above illustrates, it is not clear whether
any rate, including a fixed rate, would over- or undercompensate
in practice.'5 8 Because discounting is inherently imperfect,
courts rarely achieve "perfect compensation." Accordingly, inefficient breach may occur no matter what discount regime captures
the court's attention. This fact, however, does not deter courts
from discounting future awards to present value now and should
not deter them from adopting the fixed-rate approach in the future.'59 Any "rough and ready" damage award simply runs the
risk that parties may breach too much or too little. A fixed rate,
however, carries the same risk at lower cost.
Furthermore, parties can correct an inefficient breach "problem" through ex ante and ex post negotiations. If the default rule
is noncompensatory, parties can easily construct efficient breach
incentives with a properly discounted liquidated-damages provision that properly compensates the injured party. Alternatively,
even without a liquidated-damages provision, parties may renegotiate upon breach, striking a new bargain that is satisfactory to
all involved. 6 ' Indeed, a fixed rate may reduce transaction
costs, fixing a baseline for bargaining over the discounting process or allowing parties to focus on more important issues. With

If a breaching seller must pay damages equal to the value of the goods to the first
buyer, the seller will find it profitable to breach the contract only if the second buyer
is willing to pay more than that amount.... [Slmaller damage awards could make it
more profitable for the seller to breach even when the second buyer is not willing to
pay more then the goods are worth to the first buyer, while larger awards could
make it unprofitable to breach even when the second buyer is willing to pay more.
Thus, only a perfectly compensatory remedy appeared to give the seller the right
incentives in deciding whether or not to breach.
1" See text accompanying notes 150-55.
"5 Even damages that do not require discounting "often fall short of a truly compensatory measure due to the exclusion of such items as attorneys' fees, unmeasurable
subjective losses, and 'unforeseeable' damages." Craswell, 61 S Cal L Rev at 637 (cited in
note 126). See also John A. Sebert, Jr., Punitive and Nonpecuniary Damages in Actions
Based Upon Contract: Toward Achieving the Objective of Full Compensation, 33 UCLA L
Rev 1565, 1571-84 (1986) (detailing how expectation measures fall short of the full compensation ideal). Therefore, the critical assumption of efficient-breach theory-that compensation is perfect because it captures all private and social costs-is probably inaccurate under any discount-rate regime. See generally Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient
Breach Fallacy, 18 J Legal Stud 1 (1989).
"6 See Craswell, 61 S Cal L Rev at 635-36 (cited in note 126) (explaining the renegotiation option).
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reduced transaction costs, renegotiation is more likely, and a
noncompensatory remedy matters less. 6 ' Thus, claims of inefficient breach should not stop a court from adopting the fixed-rate
approach.
Another critique of the fixed-rate regime might be that, as a
default rule, it imposes unnecessary drafting costs on parties.
Because it is not tailored to the particular situation, the fixedrate rule may force parties to draft present-value clauses that fit
their unique expectations. If these costs are higher than those of
allowing a court to determine the rate, then changing the current
rule may impose costs that parties would like to avoid.
This point should not persuade a court to reject the fixedrate regime. An investment in the certainty of a contractual provision that sets the discount rate or provides for a selection methodology probably is more cost-effective than letting the courts
decide the rate at their discretion. Parties in specific industries
could standardize their present value formulae, enabling them to
spread the initial outlay of determining the proper methodology
across a number of transactions. Litigation, however, generates a
unique outcome for each case, so expert and lawyer expenditures
are necessarily duplicative. Moreover, a bargained-for damages
clause could fix the discount rate if breach occurred, and thus the
costs of negotiation would at least yield the benefits of certainty.
An investment in litigation costs, however, buys the parties no
more than a ticket to the legal lottery, producing only an uncertain return. Accordingly, a fixed rule that encourages damage
provisions probably does more good than harm.
A final critique might be that commercial parties would prefer the discretionary regime because the rampant uncertainty in
damage awards deters breach and keeps the parties in line. Because the discount rate is uncertain ex ante under the discretionary regime, parties may not be able to properly evaluate the
costs and benefits of breach. Given an unclear and expensive
evaluation process, commercial parties may opt for the more
definite path of simply performing the contract.
Uncertainty, however, cuts both ways: perhaps it discourages
breach, but it could just as easily encourage breach by distorting
the party's evaluation of its costs and benefits.' Just as a par-

161Id.
162 Just as uncertainty generates asymmetrical evaluation and drives parties further

apart in the litigation model, see text accompanying notes 146-49, it may similarly distort
predictions when deciding to breach or not.
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ty might overestimate its potential liability from breach by predicting that the court will choose an unfavorable discount rate, so
it might underestimate its potential liability by predicting that
the court will choose a favorable one. Thus, the discretionary
discount regime may in fact encourage breach, thereby erasing
the deterrence value posited above.
Ultimately, the discretionary discount rate's deterrence value, if any, should pale in comparison to its costs. The total cost of
experts, litigation, and uncertainty casts a long shadow over the
entire contracting process. Parties are forced to incur these costs
because the law-and not business-has chosen a discretionary
regime. The fixed rate, however, cures many of the ills of the
discretionary regime, adding new benefits and imposing fewer
costs. Faced with "the full range of prospects and perils that the
contract itself addresses at formation,"1" most parties would
opt for a quick fix for the legal lottery.
CONCLUSION

A clear default rule should guide courts when they choose
discount rates to calculate the present values of lost profits in
commercial-contract disputes. The current discretionary regime
has generated a confused jurisprudence, subjecting sophisticated
commercial parties to a legal lottery in which expensive experts
battle for unpredictable results. A discount rate pegged to an
easily identifiable market index would eliminate the potential for
expert bias, the excessive costs, and the unnecessary uncertainty
that marks the discretionary regime. By adopting this "rough and
ready" default rule for choosing discount rates, courts will make
commercial parties better off and enhance social welfare. Indeed,
by fixing the legal lottery, courts will finally abide by their commitment to clarity and certainty in contract law.

"5 Epstein, 18 J Legal Stud at 112 (cited in note 121).

